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Quality of Governance and Stock
Market Performance: The Nigerian
Experience
Ajide, K. B.*
Abstract
The paper examined the impact of governance on stock market performance using
quarterly data series spanning 1996Q1 to 2010Q4. An ARDL bound testing methodology was
employed to explore such causal relationship. Long-run stable relationships were
established through the error correction terms of each of the measures used to the tune of 0.4821,-0.4034 and -0.4080 for all share price index, market capitalisation and the value of
total stock traded, respectively. Findings indicate that macroeconomic and financial
stability should be constantly maintained and promoted as it constitutes a drag on the stock
performance; any acts of corruption should be eschewed as it scares away potential
investors into the country and the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies
should be enhanced altogether.

I.

Introduction

T

he stock market performance is an important barometer by which the

financial health of an economyis gauged. The centrality of the market as well

as its functionality has been accentuated by the recent global financial crises

occasioned by the sub-prime mortgage lending originated in the US housing
market. The contagious impact of the resulting crises had unavoidably inflicted
unquantifiable collateral damages to all and sundry. The cost of damage
experienced, however, depends, to a greater extent, on the level of integration of
a country's financial market with the international capital market. The inevitable
outburst of the crises has consequently forced many economies to embark on bail
out schemes in their various domains in order to save some of the ailing sectors and
companies which may not ordinarily have survived such calamity-imposing
phenomenon.

*Ajide, K. B. (Ph.D) is a staff of the Department of Economics,University of Lagos,Lagos, Nigeria. Email:
kazeemajide@gmail.com. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Evidences have, however, shown that governance and stock market
performance are somewhat inseparable; thus, suggesting they both go
parripassu. This is underscored by the fact that a precondition for financial market
development is the improvement of the institutions, which govern the process of
exchange. Aggarwal et. al., (2002) noted that fund managers invest less in
countries with poor legal environments and low corporate governance standards.
Thus, better governance environments can increase returns to shareholders by
reducing both transaction costs and agency costs (Hooper et. al.,, 2009). Further, a
well governed country or firm as the case may be, tends to score highly in stock
market ratings than a poorly governed one. More importantly, the post-financial
crises' reports of countries poor and volatile stock market prices have lent
credence to the fact that the enormity of firm-specific corporate governance
abuses thrives under the ambiance of poor country-level governance
environments of the country concerned.
Observably, the African continent is notorious for her poor governance records
and this has been found to constitute a stumbling block on her growth trajectory for
decades. Unarguably, Africa has had a chequered past in terms of good
governance records as compared with the advanced countries. The history of
poor and bad governance is particularly appalling for sub-Saharan Africa where
dictatorial tendencies and sit-tightism syndrome seem more prevalent than any
other continents in the world. Nigeria, just like other countries within the sub-region
had witnessed series of regime shifts from the extreme decree-based to
constitutionally-inclined system of governance. Amid these developments, several
cases of mis-governance remain the common feature of Nigeria's socio-economic
and political landscape. Thus, effective functioning of any investment activity
hinges on good corporate governance mechanisms, which in turn depend on the
quality of governance framework of a country. This is because firms do not operate
in a vacuum as they
1 are affected by the governance systems in which they
operate. Specifically, the issue bordering on corporate governance problem has
been found to be more prevalent in the financial segment of the economy. This in
effect, implies that the quality of a country's governance is known to have rippling
effects on the operation of financial and capital markets through its influence on
the availability of external financing, cost of funding, market valuations, and
quality of investments (see, Hail and Leuz, 2006; Hooper et. al., 2009; Chen et. al.,
2009; Giannetti and Koskinen, 2010; Chiou et. al., 2010; among others for detailed
exposition).
1

The important interaction between governance mechanism at firm level and country-level
governance framework is illustrated in a number of cross-country studies such as Klapper and Love
(2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), Chen et.al., 2009, Bruno and Claessens (2009), among others.
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The situation has so degenerated to the extent that there are reported cases of
flagrant abuses of corporate governance codes and guidelines among the
management and other top decision making units of organisations. This is rampart
among the financial institutions in the economy. For instance, government at
different points in time has had to interfere with running and workings of the
Nigerian financial sector owing largely to corporate governance abuses by the
financial and other fund managers alike. As a corollary, some experts and stock
analysts have attributed post-global financial crises crash of the Nigerian Stock
Exchange market, in part to governance abuses among the financial managers
as well as captains of the industry. In view of the various misgovernance and
extreme intervention through battery of reforms by the government towards
maintaining sound financial architecture, the pertinent question remains: to what
extent does governance influence stock market performance in Nigeria.
Most empirical studies that had been conducted in the past focus mainly on firmspecific corporate governance as it affects stock market returns or prices as the
case may be. This study charts a different path as it beams a searchlight on the
country-level governance environment under which firm-specific corporate
governance is implemented. The underlying assumption is that if a sound countrylevel governance structure exists, then all things being equal, all other subgovernance structures will be bettered. Governance factor apart, literature is also
replete on other factors as playing contributory roles on stock market
performance. These include but not limited to country ratings (Erb et. al., 1995;
Bekaert et. al., 1997; Bekaert and Harvey, 2000, Cantor and Packer, 1996),
valuation ratios (Campbell and Shiller, 1998; Fama and French, 1992; Maroney et.
al., 2004; Claessens et. al., 1998; Groot and Verschoor, 2002), inflation rates (Erb et.
al., 1995; Hooper, 2009), population demographics (Bakshi and Chen, 1994;
Bekaert et. al., 1998), exchange rates (Bailey and Chung, 1995; Harvey, 1995), and
sovereign spreads (Gendreau and Heckman, 2003).
The novelty of this study over the previous related studies stems from the following
grounds: First, we are not aware of any country-specific studies on governancestock market performance for Nigeria thus signifying that ours represent the first
empirical attempt at investigating such relationship for the country. Second,
literature on the subject is scanty and is usually conducted at the cross-country or
sectional levels. As a consequence, this study adds new empirical evidence to the
existing stock of knowledge. Third, an advanced econometric technique of Bound
testing approach of ARDL is employed. Lastly, a high frequency dataset is used
thus guaranteeing the credibility of estimates as well as ensuring a more robust
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policy recommendations.
While section one gives the introductory part, section two presents the stylised
facts about governance and stock market performance in Nigeria. Section three
reviews the literature on governance-stock market performance nexus with a view
to situating the issue in the proper perspective and also the layout of the
theoretical framework on which the study is anchored. The methodological tools
to be adopted is properly outlined in section four.

Section five presents the

empirical analysis of the findings while section six concludes and gives policy
recommendations.

II.

Stylised Facts on Governance and Stock Market Performance in
Nigeria

This section presents some stylised information about the trends of key variables like
value of total stock traded, market capitalisation, all share price index, number of
listed companies, inflation, real interest and exchange rates as well as the
components of governance index for Nigeria. It can be observed from Figure 1
that there have been sustained growths both in the values of total value of stock
traded and market capitalisation. The latter witnessed unprecedented jumps in
growth beginning from 2002 up till 2007 before it nosedived sharply due mainly to
global financial crises occasioned by sub-prime mortgage lending originated in
the US housing bubble in the late 2007. Similar pattern of movements are also
observed in the case of the former.

Source: Author’s Graphed based on World Development Indicators (WDI, 2015)
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We also observed consistent upward trend of movements in the number of listed
companies in Nigeria but slight downward trends became noticeable between
2006 and 2012. The fall in the number of companies can be said to be due to the
spate of liquidations experienced by the listed companies for the reasons that has
to do with corporate governance problems like insider dealings, irrecoverable
debts, falsification of accounting records, etc.
The macroeconomic environment can also be explained within the context of
macroeconomic instability as captured by the inflationary trend, real interest rates
and exchange rate, respectively. Double digit inflation rates largely characterised
the Nigerian experience and this became heighted in 1995 when the rate was well
over 70 percent. Beginning from 1996 till 2012, there were remarkable declines
from the rates owing largely to policy targets aimed at maintaining price stability
usually at single digit. For the real interest rates, the values were in large part
negative for the most part of the period under consideration. With double digit
inflation rate and negative values of real interest rates, the performance of stock
were adversely affected. Further, the value of naira to dollar kept depreciating for
the large part of the period as can be observed from Figure 2.

Source: Author’s Graphed based on World Development Indicators (WDI, 2015)

The components of governance index like voice and accountability, political
instability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of
corruption are in negative values beginning from 1996 up till 2012, thus, portending
bad and worsening condition of governance in the country. Of the components,
political instability drifts away from the baseline as compared to others as can be
observed from the diagram. Same goes for rule of law and control of corruption
lines.

Ajide : Quality of Governance and Stock Market Performance: The Nigeria Experience
Figure 3: Trends of Governance Dimensions in Nigeria (1996-2012)

Source: Author’s Graphed based on World Governance Indicators (WGI, 2013)

III.

Literature Review on Governance-Stock Market Performance Nexus

Extensive literature has documented the importance of stock market
2

development in stimulating economic growth . The strand of literature that dwells
on the relationship between governance and stock market performance is still
emerging and scanty. The seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) provided
3

the early literature on governance but focused on firm-level agency costs arising
from the ownership and control delineation structure of firms. The more recent
literature (see, La Porta et. al., 1997, 1998, 2000; Ball et. al., 2000; Gul and Qui, 2002;
Shleifer and Wolfenson, 2002) shifted the focus from firm-specific corporate
governance to country-level governance environments.
Garcia and Liu (1999) empirically explored the determinants of stock market
development, particularly market capitalisation. They also examined the
association between financial intermediary development and stock market
development using a sample of fifteen industrial and developing countries from
1980 to 1995. They concluded that real income level, saving rate, financial
intermediary development, and stock market liquidity are important predictors of
market capitalisation, while macroeconomic stability does not have any
explaining power. They confirmed that stock market development and financial
intermediary development are complements rather than substitutes.
2 For example, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996a), Singh (1997), and Levine and Zervos (1998) find that stock market
development plays an important role in predicting future economic growth. The World Bank Economic Review issue of
May 1996 is dedicated exclusively to the role of the stock markets in economic growth.
3
Love (2010) provides a good review on corporate governance and performance around the world.
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Lombardo and Pagano (2000) estimated the correlation between the quality of
the institutional environment and the return on equity for a cross-section of national
stock market indices from both developed and emerging markets. They use
several measures of the return on equity, such as the total return on national equity
markets (controlling for risk premia), accounting-based measures of return
including dividend yields and earning-price ratios (controlling for international
differences in growth and inflation), and the degree of initial public offering (IPO)
underpricing. They found that all estimates reveal a positive correlation between
the risk adjusted return on equity and measures of the quality of legal institutions.
These measures include the origins of the judicial system, respect for the law, lack
of corruption among government officials, quality of accounting standards and
the risk of contract repudiation. The same results were found when they used
accounting measures of the rate of return on equity: both the dividend yield and
the earnings-price ratio were found to be positively correlated with measures of
the quality of legal institutions.
Naceur et. al., (2007) investigated the determinants of stock market development
in 12 Middle-Eastern and North-African region countries, employing fixed and
random estimation technique. Their results showed that saving rate, financial
intermediary, stock market liquidity and stabilisation variables appeared as
important determinants of stock market development. In addition, it was found
that financial intermediaries and stock markets are complements rather than
substitutes in the growth process.
Hooper et. al., (2009) used international asset pricing models to investigate the link
between the quality of government institutions and the performance of global
stock markets. The results demonstrate a significant positive association between
stock market performance measures and the quality of the institutional
environment. Performance measures examined for the cross-section of countries
were the average monthly stock index excess returns and the Sharpe ratio. All
measures of performance were adjusted for global and local risk factors known to
explain their international variation. The quality of governance is also found to be
negatively associated with stock market total risk and idiosyncratic risk, consistent
with the notion that stable institutions are linked to reduced variations in equity
returns. These findings suggest countries with better developed governance
systems have stock markets with higher returns on equity and lower levels of risk.
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Lowry et. al., (2010) examined the link between country-level governance and
global stock market returns. They found a negative relation between governance
quality and equity return. Countries with low governance scores, on average, had
higher equity returns than those with high governance scores after controlling for
global risk factors known to influence international equity returns. The implication is
that investors associate low governance quality with increased risk and, thus,
demand higher risk premium. They also confirmed from their result that the quality
of governance as measured by political stability and absence of violence is key
governance dimension affecting international equity returns, suggesting that
heightened investor concerns over political risks had profound impact on equity
markets. Interestingly, they found no evidence that variation in equity returns is
affected by the governance indicator representing voice and accountability.
The foregoing provides the basis for the void the study intends to plug, which
distinguishes it from previous studies at least in a major respect. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper represents one of the pioneering studies that has examined
the possible impacts of governance on stock market performance for the subSaharan region at a country-specific level.

IV.

Model Specification, Data and Estimation Techniques

This section presents a framework to model the impact of governance on the stock
market performance and the objective is to identify the simple relationship
between stock market performance, components of governance index and
some selected key macroeconomic variables. In line with the previous empirical
studies, the causal relations among the variables is, thus, specified as follows:
STKPERF = f (GOVERNANCE _ FACTORS,CONTROL _ VAR ..........................................(1)
Where STKPERF represents stock market performances, GOVERNANCE_FACTORS
as components of governance index and CONTROL_VAR stands for other control
variables. GOVERNANCE _ FACTORS can be decomposed as:
(GOVERNANCE _ FACTORS,CONTROL _ VAR f (CC, GE,PS, RL, RQ, VA).........................(2)
Governance comprises of six governance measures (World Governance
Indicators-WGI) provided by the World Bank as proxies of countries' governance
quality (Kaufmann et al., 2006). The indicators are constructed using an
unobserved components methodology (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Control of
Corruption (CC) captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is
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exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as
well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Political Stability and
Absence of Violence (PS) measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the
government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent
means, including domestic violence and terrorism. Government Effectiveness (GE)
captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's
commitment to such policies. Regulatory Quality (RQ) indicates perceptions of the
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Rule of Law (RL)
represents perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence. Voice and Accountability (VA) captures perceptions of the extent to
which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. We then
specify the empirical model as:
STKPERF i = f (CC, GE, PS, RL, RQ, VA, INF, RINR, EXCR)..................................................(3)
Where STKPERFi stands for stock market performance and subscript i represents
the three measures used as proxy for stock market performance such as all-share
price index, market capitalisationand value of total stock traded.
A positive relationship ishypothesised between any of the stock market
performance measures and governance indicators. That, an improvement or
increase in any of the governance indicators is expected to increase the value of
stock market performance. Hence CC, GE, PS, RL, RQ and VA in relation to stock
performance measures should be greater than zero and the converse holds in the
case of the diminution in governance indicators. Inflation reduces the value of
stock market performance, thus, suggesting that it has negative effects on stock
market activities. A higher interest rate has a tendency of stimulating stock market
activity and conversely a lower rate of interest discourages investment activities.
In this case a negative relationship is hypothesised. Finally, an inverse relationship is
posited between exchange rates and stock market performance. Symbolically, it
can be stated as:
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IV.1
Methodology
The methodology adopted inthis study is designed to assess the impact of thez
governance on stock markets performance in Nigeria. In this study, the
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration as outlined by
Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997 and Pesaran and Shin, 1998 was used. The ARDL model
has been chosen here because it has numerous advantages. Firstly, it can be
applied irrespective of whether the individual regressors are integrated of the
order I(0) or I(1). Secondly, the ARDL model takes sufficient number of lags to
capture the data generating process from a general to specific modeling
framework (Laurenceson and Chai, 2003). Thirdly, the ARDL approach yields
superior estimates of long-run coefficient, and, the diagnostic tests of the
estimated equation are more reliable Gerrard and Godfrey, 1998, p.235 and
Laurenceson and Chai 1998, p 405). Fourthly, from the ARDL model, one can derive
a dynamic error correction model (ECM) through a simple linear transformation
(Banarjee et. al., 1994, pp 50-52). The ECM also helps us to measure the short-run
relationship among the model's variables. Finally, the ARDL model is a more
appropriate measure in the case of a smaller sample. Since the sample size of our
study is limited to 60 observations, it provides more motivation for the study to apply
the ARDL approach for analysis.
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where D
=
1st difference of a variable, L indicates that the data set are expressed in
natural logarithms,
x
is a constant,
0
r
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x
x
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1
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0
X
X
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;
is
1
1
0
t
the white noise error.
The implementation of the ARDL approach involves two stages. First, the existence
of the long-run nexus (cointegration) between variables under investigation is
tested by computing the F-statistics for analysing the significance of the lagged
levels of the variables. Pesaran, Shin, and Smith(1999) and Narayan(2004) have
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provided two sets of appropriate critical values for different numbers of regressors
(variables). This model contains an intercept or trend or both. One set assumes that
all the variables in the ARDL model are I(0), and another assumes that all the
variables are I(1). If the F-statistic lies above the upper-bound critical value for a
given significance level, the conclusion is that there is a non-spurious long-run level
relationship with the dependent variable. If the F-statistic lies below the lower
bound critical value, the conclusion is that there is no long-run level relationship
with the dependent variable. If it lies between the lower and the upper limits, the
result is inconclusive. The general form of the null and alternative hypotheses for the
F-statistic test is as follows:
HO:
X
=
X
=
X
=
X
=
X
=
X
=
X
=
X
=
X
=
X
=
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
HO:
X
¹
X
¹
X
¹
X
¹
X
¹
X
¹
X
¹
X
¹
X
¹
X
¹
0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
(5)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
Secondly, if the cointegration between variables is identified, then one can
undertake further analysis of long-run and short-run (error correction) relationship
between the variables.The error correction representation of the series can be
specified as follows:
p

p

p

p

p

D
STKPERFt =
xx
STKPERFtx
INFtx
RINRtx
EXCRt x
CCt0 +
å
1D
i+
å
2D
i +
å
3D+
i
å
4 D+
i
å
5D
i+
i=
0

p

p

i=
0

p

i=
0

p

i=
0

i=
0

p

x
D
GE +
x
D
PS +
x
D
RL +
x
D
RQ +
x
D
VA +
y
ECT +
e
….(6)
å
å
å
å
å
6
i=
0

ti
7
i=
0

ti
8
i=
0

ti
9
i=
0

ti
10
i=
0

ti

t1
t

Where Y
is the speed of adjustment parameter and ECM is the residuals obtained
from equation 1 (i.e. the error correction term). The coefficient of the lagged error
correction term Y
is expected to be negative and statistically significant to further
confirm the existence of a co-integrating relationship.
Data Source
The data were sourced from Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin
various issues, Nigerian stock market fact book, World Development Indicators
(WDI) 2012, World Governance Indicators (WGI) by Kaufmann et.al., 2012.
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V.

Analysis of Empirical Results

Following the convention in contemporary time series investigations, to avoid
spurious regression estimates, unit root tests are carried out. The results of Ng and
Perron (2001) unit root tests are reported in Table 1. Ng–Perron test is preferred as
the results are more reliable and consistent compared with the traditional ADF and
P–P tests. DeJong et. al., (1992) and Harris and Sollis (2003) argued that due to their
poor size and power properties,these tests are not reliable for small sample size.
These tests will over-reject the null hypotheses when it is true and accept the null
when it is false. Ng–Perron test circumvents the problem of over-rejection of null
hypothesis and can be applied on small sample size. Table 1 shows that some
variables are I(0) while some are I(1), thus, providing the justification for the use of
ARDL.
Table.1: Results of the Ng-Perron unit root test
Variables

ALLSHR
MKTCAP
TVSTK
CC
GE
PS
RL
RQ
VA

MZa

MZt

Level

First Diff.

Level

-12.63241**
-17.9712**
-5.7432
-4.9871
-5.1551
-7.9770
-4.0918
-5.9776
-4.4616

-34.9812***
-52.9081***
-29.9342***
-18.9816**
-19.8614**
-22.9123***
-28.9181***
-20.0198**
-19.0445***

-3.7617
-4.6175
-1.8767
-0.9871
-1.1232
-1.4526
-1.4352
-0.9898
-0.7876

First
Diff.
-3.1341
-2.9087
-5.0917
-2.9871
-3.3141
-4.0041
-3.1173
-2.8979
-4.7521

MSB
Level
0.1176
0.1852
0.2343
0.5464
0.4231
0.3081
0.2322
0.3397
0.2871

First
Diff.
0.1157
0.1091
0.1324
0.1171
0.1615
0.1342
0.1228
0.1671
0.1342

MPT
Level
27.8918
19.1981
29.4524
21.2341
17.9021
19.0341
20.1020
18.7681
19.7657

First
Diff.
3.6424
4.4526
5.2561
6.6123
6.2871
4.2561
3.8791
3.9082
5.0245

Note: ***(**)* indicate the significance at the 1 per cent,5 per cent and 10 per cent
respectively

Given a relatively small sample size, a lag length of 2 is used in the bounds test. The
results of the bound test are given in table 2. The critical values used in this paper
4

are extracted from Narayan (2004) . The F-statistic for the models are 6.5866,
9.8981 and 10.9538, which are greater than the upper critical bounds both at the 1
and 5 per cent significance levels. This suggests that there is a long-run relationship
among stock market performance (all-share price index, market capitalisation
and value of total stock traded) and inflation, real interest rate, exchange rates,
components of governance index such as control of corruption, government
effectiveness, political instability, rule of law, regulatory quality and voice and
accountability, respectively.
4 Narayan (2004) has provided critical values that are considered to be more appropriate for ARDL modeling using

small samples as compared to Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) and Pesaranet.al., (2001). These critical values are based
on small sample size between 30 and 80 observations, unlike Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran et al (2001)
which are based on 500 and 1000 observations and suitable for large sample size.
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Table.2: Estimated ARDL Models and Bounds F-test for Co integration
Models for estimation

Lag
Lengt
h

FStatistic
s

Critical
value at
1 pe r
cent

Critical
value at
5 per
cent

( ALLSHR / INF , RINR , EXCR , CC , GE, P S , R L , R Q ,VA)

2

6.5866

3.6745.019

2.6943.829

( MKTCAP / INF , RINR , EXC R, CC , GE , P S , RL , RQ ,VA )

2

9.8981

3.6745.019

2.6943.829

(TVSTK / INF , RINR , EXCR , CC , GE , PS , RL , RQ ,VA)

2

10.9538

3.6745.019

2.6943.829

Source: Computed
Notes: The critic al values (CV) for the lower I(0) and upper I(1) bounds are taken from Narayan (2005, Appendix:
Case II).

Table 3 presents long-run static results of an ARDL model. From Table 3, Inflation rate
was found to conform with a priori expectation of model 1 with and without control
for autocorrelation problems. In 1(a) a one per cent increase in inflation rate will
lead to -1.44 per cent decrease in all-share price index and this is statistically
significant at 1.0 per cent level. This seems logical as increasing rate of inflation has
a depressing impact on share prices as suggested by the result. The real rate of
interest also does not repudiate theoretical expectation. This is particularly true
since an increase in the real interest rate tends to drive up the demand for shares
and which consequently stimulates increase in the prices of shares. This is
statistically significant at a conventional level of 1.0 per cent in both 1a and 1b
respectively. The depreciating value of naira vis-à-vis dollar measured by
exchange rate appeared insignificant in 1(a) but statistically significant in 1(b) and
this can be said to be due to costly nature of the rate of exchange of naira to dollar
mostly by foreigners when purchasing shares in Nigeria. Also, three out of the six
components of governance index comply with theoretical predictions.
These include control of corruption (CC), government effectiveness (GE) and
regulatory quality (RQ) respectively. Variations, however, exist in terms of variables
significance in both 1(a) and 1(b). Five components appeared as significant in the
former whereas three were significant in the case of the latter. A marginal increase
in the unit of corruption control will make share prices to command much higher
prices than the case when corruption was made to thrive. A unit increase in the
coefficient of control of corruption (CC) will make all share price index to rise by
37.0 and 48.0 per cent, respectively. Also, the level of government effectiveness
will likely increase share prices by 1.43 and 1.10 percent, respectively. The
coefficient on political instability variable conveys a contrary a priori signs,
thus,confirming the declining impact of the variable on share prices.
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This is plausible as no individual or country would want to invest in a country that is
embroiled in political turmoil as witnessed by Nigeria. In fact, the level of
significance occurs at 1.0 per cent in model 1 both with and without
autocorrelation problems. Furthermore, the deficiency in the freedom of voice
and accountability and rule of law also exert negative impact on the share prices
whereas regulation impinges positive effects as can be observed on the table.
Unlike 1(a), none of the component variables appear statistically significant in 1(b).
For model 2, the resulting outcomes are almost similar to model1 except for the
variable of voice and accountability component that has negative association
with market capitalisation at the highest level of statistical significance of 1.0 per
cent most especially after controlling for problems of autocorrelation that
invalidated model 2(a). Noticeably, the impact of corruption control seems to
exert greater influence on market capitalisation at least at a 1 per cent level as
indicated on the table.
Model 3 also share similar traits with models 1 and 2 in many respects. The slight
difference, however, seems to occur in 3(b) when the impact of regulatory quality
imposes significant negative impacts on the total value of stock traded on the floor
of the stock exchange market. The possible explanation can be likened to the fact
that firms or companies will only be allowed to trade in their stocks provided all the
laid down rules guiding the conduct of the trading processes are duly complied
with. More importantly, the basic statistics measured by R-squared show that all the
models' dependent variables are adequately explained by the explanatory
variables at over 90.0 per cent while the Durbin-watson statistic fall within the
acceptable region for models 1b, 2b and 3c that were controlled for
autocorrelation problems. In addition, all the models (those controlled for
autocorrelation) passed the diagnostic tests relating to residual normality and
serial correlation.
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Table.3: Long-run Estimates of an ARDL Model
Model 1
Dependent variable:
All Share Price Index
(ALLSHR)
Without
Control for
control for
Autocorrela
Autocorrelati
tion
on (1a)
(1b)
Interce
pt
INF

Model 2
Dependent variable:
Market Capitalisation
(MKTCAP)
Without control Control for
for
Autocorrela
Autocorrelatio
tion
n
(2b)
(2a)
9.2514
10.4438
(32.9616)***
(9.7502)***
-0.0192
-0.0095
(-5.2289)***
(-3.4873)***
0.0109
0.0079
(5.2132)***
(5.2764)***
0.0019
-0.0021
(1.3721)
(-1.8255)*
1.4135
0.6018
(5.9072)***
(2.3958)**
1.2863
0.8980
(5.8708)***
(3.7678)***
-1.3479
-0.9684
(-11.4320)***
(-7.7013)***
-0.7783
-0.2194
(-2.6179)**
(-0.8679)
0.0974
0.0109
(0.6446)
(0.0974)
-0.8088
-0.5030
(-6.5646)***
(-3.7141)***
0.9800
(36.0174)***

Model 3
Dependent variable: Value
of Total Stock Traded (TVSTK)
Without
control for
Autocorrelatio
n
(3a)
9.5388
(22.8671)***
-0.0188
(-3.4492)***
0.0153
(4.9225)***
0.0029
(1.4608)
3.4169
(9.6081)***
1.8450
(5.6660)***
-1.5293
(-8.7268)***
-1.5516
(-3.5115)***
-0.3460
(-1.5416)
-0.4249
(-2.3202)**

Control for
Autocorrela
tion
(3b)

0.964
0.6448

0.987
2.1662

5.6677
(0.0588)

438.790
(0.2862)

AR(1)

3.5757
(14.3953)***
-0.0144
(-4.4447)***
0.0092
(4.9883)***
-0.0003
(-0.2692)
0.3796
(1.7926)*
1.4309
(7.3791)***
-1.0328
(-9.8977)***
-0.5689
(-2.1620)**
0.0607
(0.4542)
-0.4480
(-4.1084)***
-

4.8481
(3.3958)***
-0.0060
(-2.4505)**
0.0066
(4.8788)***
-0.0034
(-3.2698)***
0.4759
(2.1198)**
1.1012
(5.1663)***
-0.6195
(-5.5134)***
-0.0209
(-0.0923)
0.0222
(0.2216)
-0.1714
(-1.4161)
0.9845
(37.5734)***

Basic
Statisti
c
R2
D.W

0.928
0.6240

0.977
2.1129

4.9248
(0.0852)

211.003
(0.8212)

0.963
0.988
0.6065
2.1162
Diagnostic Tests
5.1188
187.783
(0.0774)
(0.4211)

2.07E+24
(0.0000)
157.57
(0.0000)
85.946
(0.0000)

0.6931
(0.7780)
0.5075
(0.4790)
8.1990
(0.0061)

1.68E+24
(0.0000)
116.134
(0.0000)
73.376
(0.0000)

0.6814
(0.7890)
0.5354
(0.4672)
6.8289
(0.0118)

9.80E+23
(0.0000)
1.88.195
(0.0000)
11.5095
(0.0013)

0.7856
(0.6864)
0.2506
(0.6185)
4.5025
(0.0387)

24.486
(0.0000)

0.1978
(0.8212)

25.974
(0.0000)

0.2142
(0.8079)

23.049
(0.0000)

0.4500
(0.6402)

RINR
EXCR
CC
GE
PS
RL
RQ
VA

2
?

NORMAL

2
?

WHITE

2
?

ARCH

2
?

RESET

2
?

SERIAL

11.8101
(6.3107)***
-0.0096
(-2.2630)**
0.0111
(4.7690)***
-0.0021
(-1.1640)
1.9109
(4.9082)***
1.7138
(4.6353)***
-0.8669
(-4.4441)***
-0.5090
(-1.3018)
-0.5082
(-2.9286)**
-0.2560
(-1.2230)
0.9807
(39.7411)***
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The results of the short-run dynamics associated with the ARDL are reported in table
4. The coefficient of ECM (-1) showed the speed of adjustment from short-run to
long-run and for all the models, they are statistically significant with negative signs.
The coefficient of the lagged error correction term for model 1 (-0.4821) is negative
and statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficient implies that 48 per
cent of the disequilibrium caused by previous quarter's shocks converges back to
the long-run equilibrium in the current quarter.Banarjeeet. al., (1994) noted that
significant lagged error term with negative sign is a way to prove that the
established long-run relationship is stable. The deviation of all share price index
from short-run to the long-run is corrected by 48.2 per cent each quarter. Just like in
the long-run, inflation and exchange rates reduce all share price index by meager
0.006 and 0.0034 percent, respectively. The real rate of interest exerts a positive
impact on share prices as indicated by t-value of 3.2117. Of the components of
governance index, the impacts of control of corruption, government effectiveness
and political instability stand out prominently as they are statistically significant at
both 1 and 5 per cent levels but with alternating signs. While that of corruption and
political instability carry negative signs and the coefficient on government
effectiveness bears a positive sign. Other components remain insignificant with
alternating signs.
In the same vein, error correction models for both models 2 and 3 confirm the
existence of a stable long-run relationship and cointegration relationship among
variables. Table.4 shows that the coefficients on the error correction term ECM (-1)
are statistically significant with the negative expected signs. This confirms the
existence of a stable long-run relationship among the variables. The coefficients
on ECM (-1) for models 2 and 3 are -0.403 and -40.8 per cent, which suggests fast
adjustment processes. Nearly 40 and 41 per cent of the disequilibrium of the
previous quarter's shock adjusts back to the long-run equilibrium in the current
quarter. All other variables remain as they are in the long-run static results.
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Table.4: Estimates of Short-run Dynamics of an
Model 1
Model 2
Dependent variable:
Dependent variable:
All Share Price Index
Market Capitalisation
(ALLSHR)
(MKTCAP)
0.0126(1.7273)*
0.0143(1.7291)*
-0.0060(-2.3981)**
-0.0095(-3.4198)***

September 2014

ARDL Model
Model 3
Dependent variable:
Value of Total Stock
Traded (TVSTK)
0.0258(2.0545)**
-0.0096(-2.2222)**

0.0066(4.7991)***

0.0080(5.2017)***

0.0112(4.7116)***

-0.0034(-3.2117)***

-0.0021(-1.7955)*

-0.0021(-1.1566)

0.4787(2.0891)**

0.5992(2.3395)**

1.9032(4.7981)***

1.1085(5.0847)***

0.9074(3.7247)***

1.7321(4.5911)***

-0.6148(-5.0847)***

-0.9617(-7.4865)***

-0.8550(-4.2990)***

-0.0190(-0.0826)

-0.2187(-0.8499)

-0.5057(-1.2701)

0.0175(0.1712)

0.0046(0.0404)

-0.5195(-2.9373)**

-0.1648(-1.3550)

-0.4919(-3.6271)***

-0.2391(-1.1373)

-0.4034(-2.2032)**
-0.0244(0.0244)

-0.4080(-2.4012)**
0.0011(0.0010)

0.635
1.996

0.66
2.000

ECM(-1)
-0.4821(-2.3611)**
AR(1)
0.0078(0.0058)
Basic Statistics
R2
0.538
D.W
1.999
Source: Computed by the author.

VI. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The paper examined the impact of governance on stock market performance
using quarterly data series spanning 1996Q1 to 2010Q4. An ARDL bound testing
methodology was employed to explore such causal relationship. The important
role of the variables like inflation, real interest rate and exchange rate were clearly
brought to fore as influencing the performance of stock measured through all
share price index, market capitalisation and the value of total stock traded. Of
interest, however, are the key roles of the components of governance index on the
stock performance. Notably, control of corruption and government effectiveness
exert positive impact while political instability had a dampening impact on such
measures of stock performance. More importantly, long-run stable relationships
were established through the error correction terms of each of the measures used
to the tune of -0.4821,-0.4034 and -0.4080 for all share price index, market
capitalisation and the value of total stock traded, respectively. Emanating from
this, are a few policy messages, which includes: macroeconomic and financial
stability should be constantly maintained and promoted as it constitutes a drag on
the stock performance; any acts of corruption should be eschewed as it scares
away potential investors into the country and the quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility
of the government's commitment to such policies should be enhanced
altogether.
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